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The lattergroupofcountries is relativ!"ly few
in number but accounts for an overwhelm-
ing portion ofLDC foreign debt, LDC
floating-interest debtand LDC foreign debt
service payments, OECD estimates put the
net floating-interest debt on non-OECD,
non-OPEC LDCs in 1982 at $166 billion, Of
this amount, four countries-Argentina,
Brazil, South Korea and Mexico-account
for $140 biIIion, or84 percent ofthe total.
Individual country percentages ofdebt
carrying floating interest rates to total debt
(net) stood at 66 percentfor Argentina, 62
percent for Brazil, 74 percent for Chile, 55
percent for South Korea and 78 percent for
Mexico. Given the new credits extended
and various foreign debtrescheduling and
refinancing schemes initiated since the end
of 1982, the net floating-interest debt out-
standing, and hence the extra debt service
costs associated with interest rate increases,
With regard to the second factor, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development(OECD) estimates thatthe
total netdebt (total foreign debt less foreign
assets) tied to floating-interest loans aver-
aged 41 percent in 1982 forthe non-OPEC
developing countries (excluding OECD
memberdeveloping countries- Turkey,
Spain, Portugal and Greece), These percen-
tages vary greatly amongthe various LDCs,
but generally the low income LDCs tend to
rely on fixed-rate loans often subsidized by
developed country governments or inter-
national agencies, while a few middle-and
higher-income LDCs depend upon private
bank loans at floating market interest rates,
Concerning the first factor, the accompany-
ingchart illustratesthe tight linkbetween the
overnight Federal Funds rate and the six-
month UBOR. Their close correspondence
suggests that a monetary tightening that
causes a given rise in the Federal Funds rate
will soon be reflected in an equal rise
in UBOR.
Interest rates and debt service
The extent to which annual LDC debt
service costs are raised by increases in U.s.
interest rates depends on two factors. One
factor is the relationship between u.s.
interest rates and the six-month London
InterbankOffer Rate (UBOR), which is the
rate to which the majorityof LDC floating-
interest debt is tied, The second factor is
the percentofoutstandingexternal debttied
to floating-interest loans. Also included in
the latter category may be the refinancing
requirements ofold fixed-interest debt
maturingduring a given period, and the
nature and size ofnewcredits extended.
The Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) decided at its May24·25 meetingto
apply slightlymorerestrainton bank reserve
positions, This move was taken against the
background ofnarrow money (M1) growing
atamorethan 14 percentannual rate during
the first five monthsofthe year-farabove
the8 percentupperbound ofthe Fed's target
range at the time-and evidence ofsome
acceleration in the rate ofbusiness recovery,
While most economic indicators suggested
that some modest monetary restraint was
warranted at the time, there remained one
major"fly in the ointment," namely, the
international debt problem,
The short-term interest rate increases asso-
ciated with slower money growth would
directly increase the foreign debt service
costs ofdeveloping countries (LDCs) and
exacerbate the liquidity problems faced by
several ofthem at a particularly vulnerable
time. Some analysts haveeven suggested
that the policy dilemma posed by the LDC
debtsituation was the single largest con-
straint on Fed policy action. This Letter
explores the policy alternatives facing the
Federal Reserve last May, and considers the
implicationsofeach forthe LDC debt
situation.
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Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not
necessarily reflect the views of the rnanagement
of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
or of the Board of Covernors of the Federal
Reserve System.
is probably greater at this time than that
suggested by OECO estimates in 1982.
Enter exchange rates
An additional complication is the effect of
U.s. interest rate increases on the real value
ofthe dollar in exchange markets (market
value adjusted for pricedevelopments here
and abroad) and, hence, the real resources
that must be given up by lOCsto service
their dollar-denominated foreign debt.
Interest rate increases in the u.s. have
generally pushed upthe dollar's real value
in currency markets, particularly during
periods ofstable inflation and when foreign
interest rate increases do not match the rise
in U.S. rates. The renewed strength ofthe
dollar in recent weeks fits this pattern
closely. U.s. interestrate increases maythus
pose an additional burden on lOCs.
To the extent that lOCs' currencies
depreciate in real terms against the dollar,
additional domestic resources mustbe com-
mitted to earn convertible foreign exchange
and meetdebtservicepayments. (This effect
will be partiallyoffsetbythe degree to which
lOCexportearnings are based on products
priced in dollars and set in world markets,
e.g., Mexican oil exports. In addition, real
depreciation oflOC currencies improves
their international price competitiveness
and tends to increase net foreign exchange
earnings over a period ofseveral years.
Nevertheless, the domestic resource cost
ofservicing or retiring foreign debt will in-
crease, as will the real cost ofimports, with
real depreciation.)
Current Fed policy
The M 1 surge experienced duringthe first
partofthis year has slowed in recent
months, growingat annual rates of 10.2 .
percent in June, 8.9 percent in July and 2.6
percent in August. One factor behind the
recent decline is presumably the policyof
modest reserve restraint followed since
May, which has brought with it some
upward movement in interestrates.
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For the purpose ofanalysis, let's arbitrarily
assume thatthe Federal Funds rate rise
associated with slower money growth is
between 100-200basis points (the Federal
Funds rate is currently only 70 basis points
above the level prevailing at the end of
May). The discussion above suggests then
that netdebtservice requirements (not nec-
essarily payments) ofthe non-OECO,
non-OPEC lOCswould jumpa minimum
$1.7-$3.4billion on an annual basis. Tothe
extent thatthedurationofhigher interest
rate levels is less than ayear-and the Fed-
eral Funds rate has, in fact, edged downward
somewhat in recent weeks-the increase in
debtservice will be correspondingly less.
Clearly, additional costs ofthis magnitude
place greater burdens on certain lOCs, par-
ticularlythose alreadyexperiencingdifficul-
ties in negotiations with commercial banks
on rolling overexisting foreign credits. It is
hardlysurprising that international bankers
are uneasy about monetary tightening, even
modest restraint. They suspect that even
small interest rate increases will strain the
currentdelicate situation.
Policy alternatives?
Although a policyofmodest monetary re-
straint may exacerbate the lOC debt service
burden in the short-run, itisdifficultto iden-
tify credible policy alternatives at this time.
Ifmoney growth had been allowed to con-
tinue at the rapid clip experienced during
the first halfofthis year-one possible alter-
nativeto immediatetightening-inflationary
expectations would have inevitably re-
ignited and rightfully so: most research sug-
gests that the average lag between excess
money growth and accelerating inflation is
between one and two years. Although such
apolicymay initiallylowerinterest rates and
ease lOC debt service costs through the
extra liquiditycreated in the economy, the
temporary respite would most likely be re-
placed by even higher interestcosts for an
extended period. The higher rates, incorpo-
rating a higher "inflation premium," would
further drain lOC resources and greatly in-6·MONTH LIBORIFED FUNDS RATE
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Conclusion
The coursecharted in Mayto tighten reserve
positions slightly in order to keep money
aggregates on track probably has the best
chanceofmaintainingasustained non-
inflationaryeconomic expansion in the
U.S., and, in turn, ofhelping to lay the
groundworkfor a long-term solution to the
LDCdebt problem. It does the latter by
expanding the LDC debtservice capacity
through exportgrowth. Viewedthis way, the
probabilityofa credible long-term solution
to thedebtproblem isenhanced, whileonly
the short-term liquidity problem ofdebt
financing is worsened. This shouldgivecon-
fidence to commercial bank lenders and
LDC borrowers that an orderly and timely
solution to the debtproblem is possible and
that majorLDC loan defaultscan be averted.
If, in addition, an economic slump were to
follow, LDC debtornations would also face
an erosion oftheir debt service capacity as
falling export sales tothe recession-ridden
industrial countries would cut into their
foreign exchange earnings. This point
deserves some emphasis. The abilityof LDC
nations to service theirdebt dependson
both debt service rquirements as well as
debt service capacity, that is, foreign
exchange earnings. Because the u.s.
economy is an importantmarket for many
ofthe majorLDCdebtornations, aperiodof
sustained growth in the u.s. facilitates an
increase in theirdebtservice capacity. The
U.S. market, forexample, accounted for
55.1 percentofMexico's merchandise
exports and 20.5 percentofBrazil's in 1982.
commercial banks would considerextend-
ing newcredits or rollingover old credits
underthese circumstances. And it is doubt-
ful whetherdebtor countries could institute
the austerity measures that would be nec-
essary to bring about the real transferof


















crease the worrisome prospectofoutright
loan defauIts.*
The problem is that it is much more difficult
to slow inflation, orto reverse the course of
accelerating inflation, than it is to avoid
inflationary pressures at the outset. Once
inflationary expectations are established
among producers and consumers (and Fed
credibility towithstand inflationary forces
is called into question), they are hard to
change. The degree ofmonetary restraint
needed to slowthis inflationarymomentum,
once begun, often brings with ithigh real
interest rates for an extended period.
The Federal Funds rate climbed to very high
levels under similar circumstances in 1979
and again in the latter part of 1980. Interest
rate increases ofthat magnitude (5-8 per-
centage points) in the present environment
would have potentiallydisastrous conse-
quences forcertain LDCdebtornations. The
netdebtservice requirementsofnon-OECD,
non-OPEC nations would jump a minimum
$8.3-$13.3 billion on an annual basis-an
enormous increase. It is doubtful whether
"'This discussion considersonlythe first round effectsof
an upturn in inflation. Countrieswith ahighpercentage
offixed-interestratedebtmayconceivablybebetteroff
in an inflationaryenvironment, for example, as the real
cost ofservicing these loans would decline.
Another possible alternative to modest re-
serve restraint would have been forthe Fed
to allow money to growunabated above its
target for a limited period, with the intentof
future tighteningonce inflationary pressures
had begun to mount. The difficultywith this
approach, however, is that the degree of
monetary restraint needed to meet given
inflation goals would inevitably be much
more stringent and involve a longer period
oftimethan the present strategy. As recent
experience has demonstrated, a period of
rapid money growth and accelerating infla-
tion followed by severe monetary restraint
usually results in a boom and bust cycle for
the economy.UOl~U!4Sl?M. 4l?ln • uo8;;uO • l?Pl?AClN • 0














Selected Assets and Liabilities
largeCommercial Banks
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
-,- -, --
loans(gross, adjusted) and investments* 161,834 800 - 52 0.0
loans(gross, adjusted) --total# 141,506 808 97 0.1
Commercial and industrial 43,063 - 60 - 1,981 - 4.4
Real estate 56,881 177 - 662 - 1.2
loans to individuals 24.424 - 6 969 4.1
Securities loans 2,798 617 419 17.6
U.S. Treasury securities* 7,541 7 1,068 16.5
Other securities* 12,786 - 16 - 1,217 8.7
Demand deposits - total# 43,080 882 1,278 3.1
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,557 - 109 1,515 5.4
Savings deposits - totalt 66.450 773 34,703 109.3
Time deposits - total# 67,201 105 - 32,355 - 32.5
Individuals, part. & corp. 61,419 83 - 28,330 - 31.6









Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Defidency (-)
Borrowings










* Excludes trading account securities.
# In~ludes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
Editorial commentsmay beaddressedtotheeditor(CregoryTong)ortotheauthor ••••Freecopiesof
this and other Federal Reserve publicationscan he obtainedby calling orwriting the Public Informa-
tion Section,Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco94120.Phone (415)
974-2246.